Web App Range
The broadest web target: one app, planted weaknesses across every OWASP-style category.
Run a Cracken operation against a deliberately vulnerable web application and see it discover and confirm a spread of common web weaknesses. This range is a single multi-user web app seeded with planted vulnerabilities across the OWASP-style categories.
https://77.42.79.6/ is a disposable, isolated lab target provided for testing Cracken, and you are
authorized to assess it. Point Cracken only at 77.42.79.6. Running the same operation against any
other host — including a production system that happens to share that address elsewhere — is
unauthorized testing.
Prerequisites
- Access to a realm in your tenant.
- A connected Tentacle with network reach to
77.42.79.6on port 443. - Optional: the built-in Web App Pentest Playbook (a system playbook available in every realm).
The target
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| URL | https://77.42.79.6/ (self-signed certificate — expect a TLS warning) |
| Type | Multi-user web application with login |
| Example account | support / 12345 |
The app ships with several low-privilege accounts and one admin account so the operation can test both unauthenticated and authenticated surfaces. The full credential list is in the appendix.
Run it in Cracken
- Open or create a realm and confirm a Tentacle is connected.
- Create a new operation and select the Web App Pentest Playbook, or describe the goal yourself —
for example: "Map
https://77.42.79.6/, then check for SQL injection, reflected and stored XSS, CSRF, IDOR, remote code execution, and authentication weaknesses. Confirm each finding." - Set the target to
https://77.42.79.6/. - Run the operation. In Manual mode you approve each proposed action; in Semi or Auto mode the agent works through the surface on its own.
A common pattern for this range is to let the agent map the app first, then spawn a sub-operation per vulnerability class so each check runs independently.
What to expect Cracken to find
The app has planted weaknesses in these categories. A successful run surfaces them as findings, with the linked hosts, endpoints, and credentials captured in the Cybergraph:
- SQL injection — in the project search, via raw string concatenation in the query.
- Cross-site scripting — reflected XSS in user search and stored XSS in the messaging feature.
- CSRF account takeover — the profile-update form has no anti-CSRF token.
- IDOR — project data is reachable by changing the object id in the URL with no ownership check.
- Remote code execution — command injection in the admin diagnostic panel.
- Authentication weaknesses — username enumeration through distinct login error messages, plus weak, reused passwords.
You have a clean PoC when the operation has confirmed at least one finding in each category and the report lists them with evidence.
Next steps
- Cyber ranges — the full list of lab targets.
- E-commerce web range — another black-box web target.
- Full estate compromise range — move from one web app to a whole network.
Appendix: range reference
Accounts and planted-vulnerability detail (spoilers)
This section is the answer key. Skip it if you want the operation to find everything on its own.
Accounts
| Role | Username | Password |
|---|---|---|
| Admin | admin | monkey |
| User | accounting | 123456 |
| User | marketing | password |
| User | sales | 12345678 |
| User | hr | qwerty |
| User | webmaster | 123456789 |
| User | support | 12345 |
| User | test | 1234 |
| User | user | 111111 |
| User | john | 1234567 |
| User | mike | dragon |
| User | dragon | 123123 |
| User | qwerty | baseball |
Planted vulnerabilities
- SQL injection — blind boolean-based, in the project search. The query concatenates raw
input. Probe value:
q=test' OR '1'='1. - Cross-site scripting
- Reflected — employee search echoes unsanitized error messages when searching a non-existent user.
- Stored — messages are saved and rendered without sanitization, affecting inbox and sent views.
- CSRF account takeover —
/profile/updatehas no CSRF token; a hosted form can change the victim's email and password. - IDOR —
/api/projects/{id}/detailsreturns any project's data regardless of membership. - Remote code execution — command injection in the admin diagnostic panel runs arbitrary system commands.
- Authentication weaknesses — login returns a different message for a non-existent user versus a wrong password, enabling username enumeration; all accounts use weak, common passwords.
These are target-app routes and behaviors, not Cracken routes.